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Economic Perspective 
DID SCOTLAND LOSE WHEN NISSAN WENT TO ENGLAND? 
David Sims and Michael Wood 
Paisley College of Technology 
The recen t dec i s ion by the Japanese 
company Nissan to open a car plant a t 
Washington, near Sunderland a i rpor t , was 
welcomed by local lobbies and the media as 
a major boost for industry and employment. 
South Wales and Humberside, the other 
regions vying to a t t r a c t t h i s seemingly 
g l i t t e r i n g indus t r ia l prize, were very 
disappointed. Although Scotland was not 
in contention for the project, rumours 
circulated in 1981 that Nissan had been 
approached about locating i t s proposed 
Br i t i sh operation at the vacant Linwood 
s i t e . 
Before deciding whether Scotland has 
missed a bounty of indust r ia l growth, 
there are several searching questions to 
be answered. Our research on Linwood 
alerted us to the necessisty of examining 
the long-term impact of prestige projects 
on e x i s t i n g i n d u s t r i a l s e c t o r s and 
structures.* After outlining the Nissan 
deal, we discuss some of i t s possible 
effects. 
The Nissan Project 
N i s s a n ' s d e c i s i o n to e s t a b l i s h a 
manufacturing base in Britain i s no sudden 
whim. The project's origins can be traced 
back as far as February 1980 when the 
government held secret talks with senior 
Nissan execut ives . After a thorough 
f eas ib i l i t y study the company concluded 
t h a t inves tment was a w o r t h w h i l e 
proposition. 
However negotiations were interrupted by 
dissension within the Nissan camp. Ichiro 
Shioji , the Nissan trade union leader, 
objected to the size of the project and 
the lack of managerial consultation with 
the union. Similarly, Nissan chairman 
Katsuji Kawamata was very sceptical about 
investing £300 million in Britain to build 
200,000 cars per year with a workforce of 
4,500. Nissan president Takachi Ishihara 
eventually won approval for the project 
when he agreed to sca le down the 
investment. 
On 1 February 1984 Nissan announced that 
i t s Br i t i sh investment was to l i e in two 
stages. The f i r s t £50 million input was 
detailed for building a new factory, where 
from 1986 500 workers would assemble 
24,000 cars per year from k i t s imported 
from Japan. Nissan also agreed to take a 
decision in 1987 about whether to go ahead 
with a further £300 million investment to 
construct a fully-fledged manufacturing 
plant making, by 1991, 100,000 cars per 
year with a workforce of 3|500. 
The government's deal with Nissan includes 
regional grants up to a maximum of 22% of 
the cost of building, plant and machinery. 
This amounts to £11 million for stage one 
of the project, plus another £100 million 
if the manufacturing plant is established. 
How far t h i s public expenditure outlay 
wi l l "introduce a major, e f f ic ient , new 
domestic customer for the UK components 
sector", as Industry Secretary Norman 
Tebbit boldly asserts, is discussed below. 
Components 
In our Linwood research we found that few 
linkages were forged between the car plant 
and local engineering firms. Rootes' 
concern for S c o t t i s h indus t ry , so 
prominent during negotations for s ta te 
assistance, turned out to be l i t t l e more 
than a public r e l a t ions exercise. As a 
r e su l t , Linwood fai led to become the 
nucleus of a new l i g h t engineer ing 
network. 
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Likewise there i s great uncertainty about 
Nissan's intended components purchasing 
policy. The company has agreed to include 
60% local content ( r i s ing to 80% in stage 
two of the project) in i t s cars assembled 
in Britain. However some motor correspon-
dents have dist inguished local content 
from local parts. Local content i s a 
more f lex ib le category which can include 
expenditure on such items as advertising, 
packaging, sales and power. Nissan may 
use t h i s loophole to bend ru les about 
buying parts made in Britain or other EEC 
countries. 
Furthermore, as components manfactured in 
the Far East are often 40% to 50% cheaper 
than in Europe, i t i s un rea l i s t i c to 
assume tha t Nissan w i l l not cash in on 
this cost advantage. If i t does, precious 
few orders wi l l be placed with Br i t i sh 
workshops, except as token gestures to 
appease the government. This action may 
induce Brit ish-based car firms to follow 
su i t endangering what i s l e f t of the 
already struggling components industry in 
the West Midlands. 
Impact on the British Car Industry 
The government believes tha t the Br i t i sh 
car industry will benefit from the influx 
of a Japanese company. Increased 
competition, plus Japanese production 
methods and labour r e l a t ions w i l l , i t i s 
argued, make domestic car producers more 
e f f ic ien t in the long run. But wi l l the 
Nissan venture destroy more jobs than i t 
creates? 
Trade unionists like Ken Gill of TASS and 
i n d u s t r i a l i s t s l i k e Bernard Hanon, 
p r e s i d e n t of Renaul t , see t h i s as a 
d i s t i n c t pos s ib i l i t y . As yet , Nissan's 
plans do not appear to threaten Br i t i sh jobs because of the modest production 
target of the in i t i a l "screwdriver plant". 
Moreover, Nissan have agreed to include 
th i s figure in the quota t o t a l which 
l imits Japanese new car r eg i s t r a t i ons to 
under 11% of British sales. 
Nonetheless, as the Guardian (26/10/83) 
points out: "If the cars are a Br i t i sh 
product, they will compete in the British 
market as British-made cars, which means 
fewer BL cars, fewer Fords, or Vauxhalls, 
or Talbots w i l l be sold". Now, whilst 
the American-owned multinationalists Ford 
and Vauxhall have the resources to cope 
with t h i s competition, BL and Talbot are 
more vulnerable. For example, Nissan 
would seriously rival many of BL's models 
which supply company f l e e t s . Not 
forget t ing the January 198M P a r i s i a n 
demonstrations by French Talbot workers 
against 2,000 planned redundancies, a 
s u c c e s s f u l Nissan opera t ion might 
in te r fe re with investment by Peugeot 
Talbot in i t s British operation. 
In March this year Peugeot announced a £20 
million investment for Ryton, Coventry, to 
re-equip the plant for production of a new 
light-medium saloon. The future of the 
6,000 Ryton jobs i l lus t ra tes the problems 
involved with surrendering control of 
industrial development to foreign agencies 
outside democratic control. Similarly the 
government's unreserved support for the 
Nissan scheme increases the proportion of 
branch plants within the Br i t i sh car 
industry, and so reduces i t s a b i l i t y to 
make effective planning interventions. 
Nissan's Objectives 
Amid a l l the publicity surrounding the new 
plant in the North East, l i t t l e has been 
said about Nissan's policy objectives. 
Nissan is a multinational company whose 
expansionism goes back to the 1960's when 
i t opened a manufacturing plant in Mexico. 
Now i t owns some 30 p l a n t s in 23 
countries. This prompts the question of 
how far Nissan view the British investment 
as essential. 
P res iden t I s h i h a r a i s convinced tha t 
penetration of the European market i s the 
best way to replace Toyota as Japan's 
premier car producer. A pre-requisite for 
t h i s policy i s the establishment of a 
manufacturing base within an EEC member 
s t a t e to circumvent EEC pro tec t ion i s t 
limitations on Japanese exports. 
I t must be stressed that relatively strong 
industrial nations like France and Germany 
are h o s t i l e to Nissan 's expansionist 
plans. In contras t , Nissan has formed 
t i e - u p s with weaker economies l i k e 
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B r i t a i n , I t a l y where i t has a $16.5 
million investment in Alfa Romeo to build 
60,000 Cherries per year in Naples, and 
Spain where i t own 55? of Motor Iberica. 
These c o u n t r i e s a re w i l l i n g to make 
enormous concessions to accommodate 
incoming multi-national firms. Consequent-
ly companies are able to dictate their own 
terms. As the Economist (4-10 February 
1984) points out, the phasing of the 
Nissan investment i s "a clever way to test 
the water wi thout catching cold." If 
Nissan meets snags in the indust r ia l 
re la t ions arena, in Br i ta in ' s components 
industry or in the British car market, the 
company can withdraw without losing a vast 
outlay. The Economists's statement that, 
"if Nissan stays, the Bri t ish Government 
has agreed (because i t had to) not to hold 
Nissan too s t r i c t l y to i t s local-content 
target", i s a further reminder of Nissan's 
power to set the l imits of this project. 
Conclusion 
I t i s not sour grapes to question the 
va l id i ty of the Nissan investment as 
Scotland was never in the running to 
secure the project . Nor i s i t unduly 
pessimistic to have reservations about the 
true potential of the venture. On Clyde-
side the painful experience of Linwood has 
highlighted the gap between planning 
expectations and outcome. 
Nissan's British car plant gives cause for 
concern on two accounts. There i s a 
strong poss ib i l i ty that i t wi l l disrupt 
the indigenous components industry by 
importing parts from the Far East. I t is 
highly l ikely that t h i s example would be 
followed by other car producers resulting 
in severe job losses in the domestic 
engineering sector. Secondly, Nissan will 
intensify supply problems in the British 
car market where already there are too 
many cars chasing too few buyers. This 
state-sponsored competition will probably 
lead to job losses for which the Nissan 
project cannot compensate. 
Final ly, the government should heed the 
l e s sons of Linwood, where the g rea t 
potential for stimulating regional growth 
was undermined by a f a i l u r e to form 
linkages between incoming multi-national 
capi ta l and indigenous manufacturers . 
This proved how dangerous i t i s to leave 
the shaping of new indus t r i a l s t ructures 
ent i re ly to migrant firms. Unless the 
Nissan investment i s carefully controlled, 
i t might well become another British indu-
s t r ia l incubus. 
• See Bookshelf 
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